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SOCIAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC WELFARE - FEDERAL ASSISTANCE AND
STATE COOPERATION, STATUTES, AND REGULATIONS IN GENERAL -
STATUTE DISALLOVING PAYMENT OF MEDICAID FUNDS FOR
THERAPEUTIC ABORTIONS HELD INVALID.
Three pregnant, indigent females sought Medicaid and public
assistance from the state of Pennsylvania in order to terminate their
pregnancies. In each case, a physician had certified that a
medically necessary, but not life-saving, abortion was needed to
preserve the mother's health. 2 Two Pennsylvania statutes which
prohibited state medical assistance payments for medically
necessary abortions, other than those necessary to save the life of
the mother, prevented the plaintiffs from obtaining abortions. 3 As a
1. Roe v. Casey, 464 F. Supp. 487, 489 (E.D. Pa. 1978). Additional plaintiffs intluded two
physicians, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, Elizabeth Blackwell Health Center
for Women, Women's Health Services, and Philadelphia Welfare Rights Organization. Id.
2. 464 F. Supp. at 490. Roe suffered constant abdominal pain front hyperemis gravidorunt, a
condition which was complicated by pregnancy and did not allos her to digest food. Moe. a 13-sear-
old, needed an abortion to preserve her health because her immature pelvis would inake Libor
difficult and possibly cause internal injuries. Hawkins needed an abortion to avoid svre
psychological damage. Id.
3. Id. Pennsylvania Public Act 16A, Appropriations Act of 1978, in pertinent part states:
No money shall be disbursed from this appropriation [S395.540.00 to the Departenot
of Welfare for Medical Assistance] to pay for, make reimbursement for, or other ise
to support the performance of ans abortion except where the abortion is certified in
writing by a physician to be necessary to save the lifc' of the mother.
Id. at 491.
Pennsylvania Public Act 148 in pertinent part states:
[Njo public funds shall be used to promote abortion, no abortion shall be subsidized
by any state or local government agency unless there is filed with such agenty a
certificate signed by a physician stating that the abortion is necessary in order to sas'c
the life of the mother....
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6607 (Purlon Supp. 1979).
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result of this, the plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief
pursuant to Title XIX of the Social Security Act. 4 The main issue
presented was whether the Pennsylvania statutes preventing
therapeutic abortions5 deprived the plaintiffs of their rights under
Title XIX.6 The United States District Court of Pennsylvania held
that Pennsylvania's prohibitions upon Medicaid funding for
abortions other than those necessary to save the life of the mother
deprived the plaintiffs of their right to receive reimbursement
pursuant to Title XIX of the Social Security Act. 7 Roe v. Casey, 464
F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
The laws proscribing abortion or limiting abortion to those
situations in which abortion is necessary to save the mother's life,
are relatively new and were virtually unknown in ancient or
common law eras. 8 During the Greek and Roman eras, abortion
practices were unrestricted. 9 Ironically, during this time, the
Hippocratic Oath, which prohibited abortion, was written. 1'
Historians believe, however, that the oath had little influence on
the attitudes of ancient physicians." The influence of the
Hippocratic Oath appeared in the English common law theory of
quickening. 12 Abortion before quickening was not an indictable
offense. 13 There was controversy, however, as to exactly what the
penalty was for abortion of a quick-fetus.1 4 Early American courts
4. 464 F. Supp. at 489. Title XIX of the Social Securitv Act is commonly referred to as the
NIedicaid Act. It wsas enacted for the purpose of assisting each state in providinLg' medical assistance
to those whose income and resources are insutticient to meet the costs of necessary iedical services.
Id. at 492-93'
5. Id. at 489. A therapeutic abortion is defined as an abortion "medicalh, necessarv or medicallv
indiiaed according to the professional medical judgment of a licensed physician... exercised in light
of all factors affecting the woman's health." Zbaraz v. Quern, 596 F.2d 196, 197-98 n.3 (7th Cir.
197o).
6. 464 F. Supp. at 489. The court noted substantial issues cooterning the plaintiffs' rights under
the first. ftourth, ninth or fourteenth amendments but found that the constitutional issues need not be
determined because the plaintiffs' federal statutory claim was dispositive of the action. Id. The
ctotrt also stated that the named woman plaintiffs on their own behalf and on behalf of the class
itluding all women had standing to assert their claims: the plaintiff doctors had standing to assert
claits on their own behalf and on behalf ofthe doctor class: the health tare providers had standing to
assert the federal statutory claims. but not the claims of the tlass including all women: and -re
Rights had standing to assert the federal statttorv claims of its members. Id. at 498-99.
7. Id. at 489.
8. Roe v. WVade. 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973).
9. Id. at 130.
10. Id. at 131. Seegenrally L. EDELSTIFN, THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH 6 (1943).
l. 410U.S. at 132.
12. Id. The cosmmon law concept of quickening 'as defined as the "first recognizable movement
of the fetus in utero. appearing usually from the 16th to the 18th week ofpregnancy ...... Id. (citing
DORt.AND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1261 (24th ed. 1965)).
13. 410 U.S. at 132.
14. Id. at 134. Englishju rist, Sir Edward Coke. believed the abortion of a child after quickening
to be a misprision, but not murder. Id. at 135. Misprision. derived from the English common law,
was translated by earl' American courts to mean misdemeanor. Id. at 136. Recently, however, it has
been argued that post-quickening abortion was never established as a common law crime. Id. at 135.
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interpreted English common law as dictating that abortion of a
quick fetus was a misdemeanor. 15 During the 19th century,
legislation was enacted by the states which placed more stringent
penalties on those seeking or soliciting abortions.1 6 Generally, the
new laws made abortion of the quick fetus second degree
manslaughter, while abortion of the fetus before quickening was a
misdemeanor. 7 The new legislation also recognized therapeutic
abortion, if necessary to save the mother's life.18 By the 1950's,
American statutory law had evolved to a point where all abortions
were banned unless necessary to save the life of the mother. '9
The criminal abortion statutes were tested in the early 1970's,
commencing with Roe v. Wade. 20 In Roe, an unmarried pregnant
woman was prevented from terminating her pregnancy by a state
stattte21 which proscribed abortions unless necessary to save the life
of the mother. 22 The state maintained that it had an interest in
insuring maximtm safety regarding the health of the mother and
that it may assert "interests beyond the protection of the pregnant
woman alone" 23 when potential life was involved. The Supreme
Court found that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting the
15. 410 U.S. at 136.
It. Id. at 138.
7. hi.
1. Id.
1l. Id. at 139.
21. d. it 113.
21. 1d. ;i 117. Articles 1191-94 and 1196 ofthe Texas Penal Code provide as follows:
1. Articic 1191. Abortion
If anv person shall designedly administer to a pregnant woman or knowingly
prc i tbe bc administered with her consent anx drug or medicine. or shall use
to ards her any violence or means whatever exte rnallv or internally applied. and
tterchy procure an abortion, he shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than two
nor more than five years; if it be done without her consent, the punishment shall be
doublcd. By 'abortion' is meant that the life of the fetus or embryo shall be destroyed
in ih \i woman's womb or that a premature birth thereol'be caused.
Art. 1192. Furnishing the means
Whoever fltrnishes the means for procuring an abortion knowing the purpose
intended is guilty as an accomplice.
.Art. 1193. Attempt at abortion
If the means used shall fail to produce an abortion, the offender is nevertheless
guiltx of an attempt to produce abortion, provided it he shown that such means were
calculated to produce that result, and shall be fined not less than one hundred nor
more than one thousand dollars.
Art. 1194. Murder in producing abortion
If the death of the mother is occasioned by an abortion so produced or by an
attempt to effect.the same it is murder.
Art. 1196. By medical advice
Nothing in this chapter applies to an abortion procured or attempted by medical
advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother.
TEXAS PENAt. ConE ANN. tit. 15, § 1191-1194. 1196 (Vernon 1907) (transferred to TEX. RFv. Ciy.
STAT. ANN., art. 4512.1-4512.4 (1973)).
22. 410 U.S. at 1211.
23. Id. at 150.
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health of the mother which must be balanced against the mother's
right to privacy. 24 Thus, the Supreme Court held that the woman's
right to privacy included the right to terminate her pregnancy, but
such a right was limited by the state's interest in protecting the
potential life of the fetus.
25
Following Roe v. Wade, the United States Supreme Court was
presented with the question of whether Title XIX of the Social
Security Act required participating states to fund the cost of
nontherapeutic abortions in Beal v. Doe. 26 The respondents in Beal
contended that Pennsylvania's law, which did not provide
Medicaid funding for nontherapeutic abortions, was unreasonable
because abortion was economically and medically necessary for
those who applied for the aid. 27 The Supreme Court stated that
Title XIX did not refer to any particular medical procedure, but
required states to provide financial assistance with respect to five
broad categories of medical treatment. 28 As such, a state plan which
failed to provide assistance for unnecessary, though desirable,
medical assistance was not inconsistent with Title XIX.29
Therefore, recognizing the state's important and legitimate interest
24. Id. at 162.
25. Id. at 164-65.
26. 4:12 U.S. 431 (1977).
27. Beal v. Doe. 432 U.S. 438. 445 (1977). The respondents argued that abortions were
gincrfily less cxlpCnsic ithan chillbirth. Furtir, if an indigent fi'male was forced to givet birth
l( c;1st, sh' isas reifsed aid, the state would eventually betar t greater fiinalcial burden in giving ;ail
It, Iti wo1tatn lor child sullport. I'h. rest ntpo de s also arguecd that ot rarlh abortion is of" lss risk to
ih w oman thtn childlbirth. Thus. the stale, Ity rtejicting sich argt ncnt, %as not appl ing tile
hurdinr hcrt ;[ iit and rconolti considhiration, ws hith usutally suppo)rt the reasinableness of state
litiatiris meii iitin itn u ftnccr ssary dical servic's. I(.
21. i at 444. 'Ihe live l oib rt d caicgorics of' medic al tretntrni are found in sct ion 1 396d of' 42
U.S.C.. whic h states in part:
(a) The term "medical assistance" means payment of part or all of the cost of the
following care and services.., for individuals, and, with respect to physicians' or
dentists' services, at the option of the State, to individuals. , not receiving aid or
assistance under any plan oftheState.
hut whrse incitn arld rsiurces ar insuflicint to intel at ofsuch cost Ishall be
entitled to parl i tFull iayicnI ofthe ftllowin:g
(I) inpalietnt tospital seriices...
(2) (A) Out p atient hoslital serviCt s ....
(3) rother lalttrraI rv and X-ras services;
(4) (A) skillid ntursing lairIt, scrvirCCs.
for individuals 21 years if age or older (B) effective July 1, 1969. such carls' and
1rrirdi st rcciting and diagnosis <n'indis idtals who are iligibl' under the plan and are
un er tliht age itf21 Ito ascertain their physical itr mental defects. anl such health care.
re'atncnt, ilnd other ini'strt's it cotrrect or amelitoiat deleicts and ihronic cindlittons
discvered th Irlty as may he proivided in regulations tf'thc Seretary: and (C) .imily
planning services ait I supplies ftrnisheil (directly or under arrangettents withI others)
it intdiidtls ot chihIbearing age (including minors who can be considered sexuallv
active) who are eligible under the State plan and who desire such services and supplies:
(5) physicians' services furnished by a physician .. whether firrnished in the olice,
the patient's home, a hospital, or a skilled nursing facility, or elsew here.
42 U.S.C. 9 13 ld (1976).
29. 432 U.S. at 447.
292
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in protecting the potentiality of life, the Supreme Court held that
Title XIX of the Social Security law did not require states
participating in the Medicaid assistance program to fund the cost of
nontherapeutic abortions. 30
The decision not to require the funding of nontherapeutic
abortions was based, in part, on the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the Social Security Act, commonly referred to as
Medicaid.3 1 The Medicaid program was enacted for the purpose of
enabling each state to furnish, as far as practical, medical assistance
on behalf of certain persons whose income and resources are
insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services.
32
Medicaid is a joint venture between the state and federal
government, with the state solely responsible for the administration
of the program.3 3 Once a state participates in the Medicaid
program, it must comply with federal statutes and regulations in
order to remain eligible for funds.3 4 Within the Medicaid program,
the qualifying state must reimburse those eligible to receive
30. Id.
31. ld. at 444-45. Social Security Act of 1965. Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 12 1(a). 79 Stat. 343
(c oiffed iat 42 U.S.C..{§ 1396 to 1396k- (1965)).
32. Roc %. Casey, 464 F. Supp. 487. 493 (E.D. Pa. 1978). Section 1396 of 42 U.S.C.. or Title
N IX of the Social Security A ct (commonly referred to as Medicaid). states as follows:
For the i purpose of enabling each State, as far as practicable under the conditions in
such State, to furnish (1) medical assistance on behalf of families with dependent
children and of aged. blind. or disabled individuals. whose income and resources are
insufficient to mteet thi' costs of necessary medical services. . . there is hereby
authorized to le appropriated for each fiscal year a sum sulficient to carry out tile
iirposes ofthis subchapter. The suits iade available tinder this section shail be used
Ior making aivtients I, Slates lwhich hav-c submittied. and had approved hv the
Secretary f Health. Flhication and \cllarie. State plans fo" nicdical assistance.
42 U.S.C. t 1396(1976).
33. 464 F. Supp. at 493.
34. Id. Section 139 a (a) (10) of 42 U.S.C. states in pertinent part that a state plan for
medical assistance roust provide tie following:.
(A) fil" making medical assistance available to all individuals receiving aid or
assistance under all-y plan of the State.... :
(B) that tie medical assistance mtade availalble to anv individual described in clause
(A) -
(i) shall not b' less in amount. duration, or scope than the medical
assistance made available to a n other such individual. and
(ii) shall not be 'ss in aniont. duration. or scope than the medical
assistance made availtble to indiv iduals not described in clause A: and
(C) ifinedical assistant is included fora group of individuals who are not described in
clauIse (-) ;lin(] wiii do nt -t ie t(ii' ilncoiti{i and r'sources requirements of the
approp~riate Stalte plan,..
(i) for making tiedical assistance available to all individuals swho would.
except for income and resources. be eligible for aid or assistance tinder any
such State plan. . and who have insuffiit .ci.. income and resources to meet
ltie costs ofnicessalr" miledical and reliedia ciare and services, and
(ii) thait the 'tedical assistance made available to all individuals not
described in clause (A) shall ie equal ii aniount, duration. and scope... to any
other individuals not descrihcd in iclatuste (A).
42 U.S.C. 5 13 9 6a (a) (10)(1976),
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Medicaid under the federal categorical assistance program. 35 The
state must also provide at least the first five of the sixteen types of
medical services provided within the statute. 36 In addition to the
services provided for the "categorically" needy, the state has the
option to provide services for the "medically" needy. 7
Pennsylvania has exercised the option and provides medical
assistance to both the categorically and the medically needy. 38
In order to make the Medicaid program operative, certain
implementing regulations were devised. 39 These regulations re-
quire participating states to specify the amount and/or duration of
each item of medical care that will be provided and such items must
be sufficient in amount, duration, and scope so as to reasonably
achieve their purpose.4 0 Further, the state may not arbitrarily deny
or reduce the amount, duration, or scope of medical assistance
solely because of the diagnosis, type of illness, or condition .41
The plaintiffs' contention in Casey was that Pennsylvania was
arbitrarily denying assistance on the basis of the type of medical
treatment needed.4 2 The United States SLupreme Court has stated
that Title XIX requires state medicaid plans to establish reasonable
standards for determining the extent of medical assistance. 43 Thesc
standards must also be reasonable and consistent with the
objectives of Title XIX. 44 The court in Casey determined the
objective of the Medicaid Act to be the provision of necessary
medical services.45 Accordingly, the state may not use its discretion
to eliminate entirely from reimbursement a medical service
35. 464 F. Supp. at 493-94.
36. Id. For section 1396d(l )-(5) o1"4 2 U.S.C.A. ve-supr n 28.
37. 464 F. Supp. a[ 493-94. Tile XIX i'siaklbishs iwo groups of' n'dy pe'rsons: (1) he"
-categorically" needy, which incluih's needy persons wiih dcpndc'ni childrc i ;inc ih,'  he ill lind
ad(l lisabled. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (1976). (2) "lh. "inedliclv'" ncedv are" hiose
emiinst rating a need for medical assistance, who also iin.,.i it( ca oerical iquirilcs of" Tilh
XIX, hut whose incomes are too high to allow them to qualikl, tir thi categorical assistance. 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C) (1976). If thi' siate ake's thc opt( ,n io provide si.rvicets Im- iht,
"medically- ne'dy, it must providc ihit lev'l of' s'r%,i cs ilis rih cd in clalusis (I) thro gh (5) )1"
1396d. 42 U. S.C. it 1396a(a) (13) (C) (i) (ii) (1976).
38. 464 F. Stipp. at 494.
39. Id. at 495. 42 C.F.R. §446.151 (1977).
40. 42 C.F.R. §449. 10(a)(5)(i)(1977).
41. Id.
42. 464 F. Supp. at 496. Pennsylvania Puhic Acs I 6A and 1481 do not providei rcioiburseocn
for abortions certified by a physician as being iniedicially riissarv. Id. As SUch, the plainils
contended that the state was denying assisiance not Ilcaus. ofic k oltneclical necessity, but hccausi'
ofthe type oftreatment required and was therefore in viola tiocn oflthe Medicaid Act. Id. (f Whiie v.
Beal, 413 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 555 F.2d 1 146 (3d Cir. 1977). White held that a
prerequisite frir state participation in the Medicaid program was fhat all " medically oecessary"
treatment be reimbursed. Id. at 1155, 555 F.2d. at 1150.
43. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438. 441 (19I77).
44. Id. at 444.
45. 464 F. Supp. at 50(0. For text ofthe pertinent satuic vet mpra note 34.
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certified by a qualified physician as being medically necessary.
46
The defendants contended that Title XIX did not explicitly
require the funding of abortions. 47 The court in Casey stated that
the plain meaning of the Medicaid Act was to provide sufficient
medical assistance, so that necessary medical services could be
provided to those eligible for the program.48 Medical necessity is
determined by the attending physician, using his professional
judgment, exercised in light of the patient's age, as well as her
physical, emotional, psychological, and familial well being.
49
Accordingly, the court held that Title XIX required participating
states to provide all medically necessary services, including
medically necessary abortions, to eligible participants of the
program.
50
Interpretation of the Hyde Amendment was also at issue in
Casey. 51 The language of this amendment prohibits the use of
federal funds to perform abortions, except where the life of the
mother would be endangered, for medical procedures necessary for
the victims of rape, or where severe and long lasting physical health
damage to the mother would result. 52 In Casey, the plaintiff's
contention was that the Hyde Amendment did not alter Title XIX,
46. 464 F. Supp. at 500. Accord, Right to Choose v. Bvrne, 165 N.J. Super. 443, 398 A.2d 587
(1979). The court in R4'/ht to Choose construed "necessary medical services" in the federal law as
applicable to abortions even though health, not life, was in danger. Id.
47. 464 F. Supp. at 496-97. The defendants are Robert Casey, treasurer of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania, and Aldo Colautti, Secretary of the Department of Public Welfare of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Id. at 490. the defendants interpreted the Medicaid Act as
providing an outline of general areas of medical treatment not requiring participating states to fund
every procedure falling within the five categories of § 139 (a)(l)-(5). Id. at 497. For text of section
1396d(a) (1)-(5) see supra note 28.
48. 464 F. Supp. at 500. The objective of the Medicaid Act is to provide assistance to those
unable to afford necessary medical service. Id.
49. Id. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973), where the United States Supreme Court
held that a physician may perform an abortion if, after considering all factors relevant to his patient's
well being, he concludes, using his best clinical judgment, that an abortion is necessary. Id.
50. 464 F. Supp. at 499.
51. Id. at 496. The Hyde Amendment is the name given to language which was inserted into the
FY 1977 and 1978 Health, Education and Welfare appropriations bill by Congress in 1977. Hyde
Amendment. Pub. L. No. 95-205, § 100, 91 Stat. 1460 (unclassified 1977). The amendment was
used by Congress as a means of making a substantive change in the Medicaid Iaw. Zbaraz v.
Quern. 596 F.2d 196, 199 (7th Cir. 1979). It has been viewed, however, as binding on the states in
the sense' that it defines "necessary medical services" in the particular instances of abortions and is a
clarification ofTitle XIX. Right to Choose v. Byrne, 165 N.J. Super. 443, 398 A.2d 587. 591 (1979).
The Hyde Amendment provides, in part,
[Nlone of the funds provided for in this paragraph shall be used to perform abortions
except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to
term: or except for such medical procedures necessary for the victims of rape or inct,
when such rape or incest have been reported promptly to a law enforcement agency or
public health service; or except in those instances where severe and long-lasting
physical health damage to the mother would result if the pregnancy were carried to
term when so determined by two physicians.
Pub. L. No. 95-205, § 101.91 Stat. 1460 (unclassified 1977).
52. Publ L. No. 95-205, S 101, 91 Stat. 1460 (unclassified 1977).
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but operated to withhold federal matching funds from the federal-
state cooperative program, or, in the alternative, that it provided
for a broader class of medically necessary abortions than either of
the Pennsylvania statutes in question. 53 The court determined that
the Hyde Amendment withheld federal matching funds from the
federal-state cooperative in the case of nontherapeutic abortions.
54
As such, the court held that the Hyde Amendment did not limit
state assistance for abortions, but that it supported such spending
"in those instances where severe and long-lasting physical damage
to the mother would result if the pregnancy were carried to term
when so determined by two physicians. "5
Casey reaffirms the premise that, if medically necessary, the
indigent female may receive assistance in paying for her abortion.56
In 1979 the North Dakota legislature enacted a statute which
provides that no funds shall be used to pay for the performance, or
for promoting the performance, of an abortion unless the abortion
is necessary to prevent the death of the woman. 57 The North
Dakota statute is similar to the Pennsylvania statutes discussed in
Casey, in that both restrict Medicaid payments unless necessary to
prevent the woman's death. 58 Accordingly, the North Dakota
Supreme Court would find the Casey analysis of Title XIX useful in
determining the validity of the North Dakota statute.5 9
The Casey court determined that a state's standards for
funding must be reasonable and consistent with the purpose of Title
XIX.6° To be reasonable and consistent with Title XIX, a state
53. 464 F. Supp. at 496.
54. ld- at 502.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 489.
57. Section 14-02.3-01 of the North Dakota Century Code states as follows:
Between normal childbirth and abortion, it shall be the policy of the state of North
Dakota that normal childbirth is to be given preference, encouragement, and support
by law and bv state action, it being in the best interests of the well-being and common
good of North Dakota citizens.
No ftnds of this state or any agency, county, municipality, or any other
subdivision thereof and no federal funds passing through the state treasury or a state
agency shall be used to pay for the performance, or for promoting the performance, of
an abortion unless the abortion is necessary to prevent the death of the woman.
N.D. CENT. ConE. § 14-02.3-01 (Supp. 1979).
58. For text of the Pennsylvania statutes see supra note 3.
59. The United States District Court of North Dakota has considered section 14-02.3-02 of the
North Dakota Century Code. which prohibits public funding to any person, public or private agency
which performs, refers or encourages abortions. In Valley Family Planning v. North Dakota, 474 F.
Stipp. 100 (N.D. 1979) (order granting preliminary injunction enjoining the application of North
Dakota Century Code section 14-02.3-02 against any person or public or private agency which refers
or encourages abortion).
60. For text of42 U.S.C. § 1396. which states the purpose ofthe Medicaid Act, see supra note 32.
Section 1
3
96a (a) (17) of 42 U .'S.C. provides that a state plan for medical assistance must:
include reasonable standards (which shall be comparable for all groups and may. in
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plan must provide for all necessary medical services and must not
arbitrarily discriminate on the basis of the type of illness. 61 The
Casey court found necessary medical services to include medically
necessary abortions. 62  Similarly, other lower courts have
interpreted necessary medical services to apply to abortions even
though the health, rather than the life, of the mother is
endangered. 63 The United States Supreme Court has not addressed
the issue specifically, but has stated that if a state Medicaid plan
excluded necessary medical treatment from its coverage, serious
statutory questions might be presented. 64 The North Dakota
statute, by prohibiting medically necessary abortions, raises some
possible statutory questions. The answer to such questions will
depend upon the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of
"necessary medical services." At present, however, the lower
courts' interpretation of the phrase would invalidate the North
Dakota statute.
The Casev court also determined that funding could not be
based upon an arbitrary or discriminatory system, where the type
of illness was considered exclusively rather than the need for aid. 65
The court in Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis66 determined that a state has
crossed the line between permissible discrimination based on the
degree of need and entered into forbidden discrimination based-on
medical condition, when it restricts the treatment of a medically
complicated pregnancy to a life or death situation. 67 The North
Dakota statute restricts funding to situations where the mother's
lif', is endangered. 6 Certainly, a valid argument may follow that
the North Dakota statute has "entered into forbidden dis-
crimination ' ' 69 by requiring funding to be dependent upon a
situation which involves a choice between life and death. The
Preterm court has pointed out that no other service discussed in the
Medicaid Act bases funding on such a distinction.70 As such, the
1ccordincc with Standards prescriled )v the SecretarV. (liffer with respect to income
hel eS ... ) lir deierii g eligilfiliiy fur and he exteit of ueil assisance inder the
flan \ Ii,' (A) arc colIsis nIt with I t ole iVcei'cs ofthis suhI ttli .I%....
42 U.S.C. 1396a (a)(17)(1976).
"i. 464 F. Supp. ;i 500.
62. Id. at 499.
63. Sr Doc v. Kenlev. 584 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1978): Emiuia G. v. Edwards. 434 F. Supp. 1048
(E.l). La. 1977): Right to Choose v. Byrne. 165 NJ. Super. 443. 398 A.2d 587 (1979).
64. 432 U.S. at 444-45. Although the Court stated that serious sittutor questions iniv he
prcscniid, it did not specit " what these qt ustions were.
65. 464 F. Supp. at 5O1f
66. 591 F.2d at 121 (lst Cir. 1979).
67. Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121, 126 (lst Cir. 1979).
68. For It'X of'ihe North )akota statt see supra note 57.
69. 591 F.2d at 126.
70. Id.
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distinction is based upon the type of illness and constitutes an
arbitrary discrimination. Accordingly, the North Dakota statute, in
light of the Casey and Preterm decisions, is invalid.
Finally, an analysis of a state's plan for the funding of
abortions must include the effect of the Hyde Amendment on the
plan. Courts have interpreted the effects of the Hyde Amendment
in a variety of ways.7" The majority of courts agree, however,
that abortions must be funded according to the specifications within
the Hyde Amendment, one of which requires payment where
severe and long-lasting damage to the mother's physical health
would otherwise result.72 Thus, regardless of Congress' intent to
alter the substantive requirements of Title XIX,7 3 lower court
decisions7 4  require that abortions to prevent physical health
damage to the mother must be funded by Medicaid. The North
Dakota statute, which does not consider the effects of childbirth on
the woman's health, is certainly inconsistent with these court
decisions.
Accordingly, the theory that therapeutic abortions may be
limited to those necessary to prevent the death of the mother is not
valid. Although it has been found that the state has made the policy
choice of encouraging childbirth,7 5 this policy must be weighed
against the right of the mother to terminate her pregnancy in light
of medical complications as diagnosed by her physician. Certainly,
the woman's medical health is extremely important.
Thus, it would seem reasonable that the state, rather than
encouraging childbirth by indigents resulting in a greater financial
burden to the state, would sanction abortions when the procedure is
medically necessary.7 6 The North Dakota Legislature in drafting a
bill77 which prohibits funding of abortions, except when necessary
71. See Zhlaraz v. Quern, 596 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1979). which held that the Hyde Amendment
aniendcd Ihe1 Medicaid Act with regards to abortions. and req uired states to fund abortions
ttltigtingo I hi specifications of the amnment, which inclided eases where severe and long-
lasting physical health damtage to the mother would result from childbirth .Id Cf Preterm, Inc. v.
I)ukakis, 591 F.2d 121, 134 (1st Cir. 1979). The Preterm court held that the Hyde Amendment
t (imitd a sulsianlive policy decision which left the states free to fund more abortions than those
Ir in I h Ii'de ral funds were made a'ailable by the amendmtoent, but that the state could not prohibit
rt inihirseincrtii fir all ;tbtrtions except those necessary to save the liie ofthe mother. Id. See Right to
'hoose %. Byrne, 165 N.J. Super. 443, 398 A.2d 587 (1979). But see D _ R__ v.
N iti hell. 456 F. Supp. 609 (Utah 1978). The court held that the Hyde Amendment substantively
changetd ihe ftinding a state was required, under the Medicaid Act, to pay for abortions and as such
Ihe siale citld limit the funding to cases where the life of the mother would be endangered if the
alort tion were nt performed. Id. at 624.
72. Zbaraz \'. Quern, 596 F.2d 196(7th Cir. 1979).
73. 591 F.2d at 128-31.
74. See supra note 71 for theseesc lower court decisions.
75. Maherv. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 477 (1977).
76. 432 U.S. at 458. See Horan & Marzen, The Moral Interest of the State in Ahortion Funding: A
Comment an Beal, Maher and Poelker, 22 ST. L.ouis I..1. 566, 578(1979).
77. For lxit ofthe North Dakota statute seesupra note 57.
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to save the mother's life, apparently has rejected this theory. The
validity of such statutes will receive final determination when the
United States Supreme Court determines what constitutes
necessary medical service, the exact effect of the Hyde Amendment
on Medicaid funding and finally, whether the Medicaid Act does in
fact require the funding of therapeutic abortions. Until these
questions are answered, states will continue to enact legislation
such as that enacted by North Dakota, which will endanger the
health of the indigent pregnant woman and discriminate against
her because she cannot afford to secure a medically necessary
abortion.
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